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THE EVOLUTION OF FORSEEABILITY IN THE
COMMON LAW OF TORT
By
Daniel J. Herron*
Laura Powell**
Elisabeth L. Silvaggio***

INTRODUCTION
“Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.”1
In the long, rich, dense, and circuitous history of the
common law, no cause of action is so fraught with legal
intrigue and controversy as tort law. Within tort law, no case
has generated so much of that legal and intellectual intrigue as
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.2 As every first year law
student learns, Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, and
Judge Andrews, writing for the dissent, have a classic battle of
the titans in arguing whether foreseeability is intertwined in the
legally-determined duty or whether it is a component of the
factually-decided proximate cause. Palsgraf creates a number
of legal questions which reflect back on, and determine the
future of common law torts. Let’s begin with the classic
overview of Palsgraf.
PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD3
Two employees of the defendant, the Long Island
Railroad, were helping a late-arriving passenger onto his train
___________________________________________________
* Professor, Miami University, Oxford OH
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when their actions caused the passenger to drop a package
containing fireworks. The fireworks exploded and the shock
wave caused a scale at the other end of the platform to fall,
injuring Mrs. Helen Palsgraf. Palsgraf sued successfully and
prevailed on appeal as well. The New York Court of Appeals,
comparable to every other state’s Supreme Court, reversed by a
4-3 decision, with Judge Cardozo writing for the majority and
Judge Andrews writing for the dissent.4
The gist of the decision was not whether foreseeability
was a requirement in determining tort liability, but where that
foreseeability was placed, so to speak. Cardozo argued that
foreseeability is part and parcel of the determination of duty,
and as such, is an issue of law. To that end, Cardozo opined
that the foreseeability requirement was not met, as a matter of
law.5 Andrews argued that foreseeability is part and parcel of
causality, specifically proximate cause, and subject to a jury’s
finding.6 As such, he argued that the trial jury found for
Palsgraf, affirmed on appeal, and thus the judgment should be
affirmed by the state’s highest court.
These arguments beg the questions of when, how and
why did foreseeability make an appearance in tort theory.
STRICT LIABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE
The source of the common law of torts comes from the
ancient English legal theory of the writ of trespass.7 It is argued
that this writ may have evolved from the appeal of a felony
since trespass required an action be alleged to have occurred
“with force and arms” (vi et armis). The writ also provided for
a jury trial and money damages.8 Rather than an innovative
development by the royal courts, it is thought that royal courts,
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in recognizing this writ, were merely reflecting what local
courts had recognized traditionally. By the fourteenth century,
the requirement of “with force and arms” had disappeared with
the recognition of the write of trespass on the case. 9 It is
interesting to note that this writ of trespass on the case would
lead to the modern tort of negligence, common law of contract
via the writ of assumpsit, property law via the writ of
ejectment, and the modern theory of restitution.10
Rather than travel through the winding, tortuous (punintended) route of tort law’s evolution from the fourteenth
century until now, let’s start with the notion that “[t]he English
law of torts—like the law of contract—was quite
underdeveloped in the eighteenth century.”11 Common law
rules of evidence prohibited both the victim and the tortfeasor,
as parties in interest, from testifying. Such testimony was
generally crucial to trial success. Likewise, in what we would
now call medical malpractice, the plaintiff had to survive in
order to pursue an action, a questionable condition in light of
the medical crudity of the times.12
It seems that prior to the advent of negligence as the
driving causation of tort, tort law reflected more of a strict
liability approach, which could be schematically reflected as
Action=>result=>injury. Thus, the actor is liable for the
resulting injury so long as the injury is causally related to the
action committed. It seems that the relationship between
Action and Result is a strict liability one, i.e. Action-causesresult (regardless of how and why). The causality issue then is
viewed as “result=>not-too-remote injury,” whatever “not-tooremote” means. “It is the general principle, that every person
is liable for the consequences of his own acts; he is thus liable
in damages for the proximate results of his own acts, but not
for remote damages.”13 So, the “Action” is not required to be a
negligent action, but any action. The strict liability here is in
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the breach of duty, not the causality of injury.
commentator notes rather definitively:

As one

…prior to 1850 remedies for civil wrongs were
governed by common law principles of strict
liability…Fault was irrelevant in trespass actions and
proximate cause as a concept was nonexistent.
Defendants were strictly liable for trespass injuries.
Indirect injuries, those that occurred as a consequence
of the defendant’s actions but not because of direct
physical contact, could be compensated for by using
“trespass on the case.”14
What caused the relatively rapid shift from strictliability to negligence in the late nineteenth century? The oftencited Morton J. Horowitz argues that the fault theory of
negligence was not established in American tort law until
“nineteenth century judges sought ‘to create immunities from
legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for
those who undertook schemes of economic development.’ The
modern notion of negligence, then, was incorporated into tort
law by economically motivated judges for the benefit of
businessmen and business enterprises.”15 Lawrence Friedman
supports Horowitz’s contention in arguing that negligencebased tort liability “has to be attributed to the industrial
revolution—to the age of engines and machines [which] have a
marvelous capacity to cripple and maim their servants.”16
“According to Friedman, nineteenth-century judges believed
that holding business strictly liable for all of the injuries they
caused could have drained them of their economic blood.
Consequently, these judges reduced tort liability to a standard
of ordinary care ‘to limit damages to some modern measure’ so
that capital could ‘be spared for its necessary work.’”17
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However, Kaczorowski vehemently disagrees with
Horowitz’s conclusion in his exhaustive review of historical
tort law.18 His rationale, though, is a bit confusing. He argues
that the shift to negligence-based tort liability and away from
strict liability is a result of changing public policy of
“economic interests of society generally, not the interests of
particular classes,” apparently referring to “business” as a
“particular class.”19 Kaczorowaki writes
As societal conditions changed, the judicial application
of these principles and policies changed accordingly to
achieve the same public policies.
Judicial
instrumentalism, understood as judges formulating,
modifying, and changing rules to achieve desirable
goals of public policy, was characteristic of the
common-law system for centuries. It was not new or
unique to the nineteenth century as some legal
historians, such as Morton Horowitz, have argued.20
He further claims that “modern tort law was not the
creation of judges in nineteenth century America trying to
protect business interests and to promote economic
development.”21 Yet, in a paragraph before this conclusion and
as referred to above, he notes “[j]udges also sought to promote
economic activity as a social good. However, they used tort
law to protect and promote the economic interests of society
generally, not the interests of particular classes.”22
Kaczorowski does an excellent job in identifying the use of
negligence in tort liability prior to the nineteenth century.23
However, an argument can be that the preponderance of using
negligence in tort liability did not fully come into its own until
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Maybe the difference
here is so nuanced that the differentiation is not clear. But there
are two “clear” conclusions to be drawn from this debate:
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1) The mid- to –late nineteenth century saw a clear shift in
tort theory away from strict liability and towards
negligence; and
2) Whether intended or coincidental, the result of this shift
clearly aided business and economic development.
It seems that by fast-forwarding fifty to sixty years or so,
history can determine that this development foreshadows the
legal realism attack on classical formalism in formalistic
contract areas, such as estoppel theories. If, as Morton claims,
these judges were social engineers, so to speak, then they did
indeed lay the foundation for legal realism’s practical resultoriented views leading us to believe that the tort liability shift
was indeed deliberate and designed for the economic result
which actually manifested itself. The timing is simply too
coincidental to conclude otherwise. Now, as to whether judges
crafted the negligence theory out of new, whole cloth, as
Morton may be implying, or whether it was the coming
together of centuries of tort evolution at this specific time is a
topic for a legal historian, which both of these scholars are, but
for our purposes, it is essentially an interesting side note.
THE EMERGENCE OF FORESEEABILITY
It seems that “foreseeability” may have been in the law
from very early times in tort evolution, but simply
unrecognized as such. Even though Frances Bacon referred to
something like “foreseeability” and even more specifically
“proximate cause” in his early seventeenth century maxim in
jure non remota causa, sed proxima specatatur,24 the maxim
was not cited in any legal opinion until the mid-nineteenth
century.25 As the previous section of this paper indicates, tortlike damage theory was rooted in a strict liability foundation.
As Pollock and Maitland identify during the reign of
Henry I in the Leges Henrici “[d]amages which the modern
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English lawyer would assuredly describe as ‘too remote’ were
not too remote for the author of the Leges Henrici.”26 However,
we begin to see cracks in the wall of strict liability in the late
eighteenth century, a full hundred years prior to the clear rise
of the articulation of foreseeability in tort theory. These cracks
begin to show in the often-cited case of Scott v. Shepherd,27
known more famously as the “squib case.”
The case involves a youth, Shepherd, who tossed a lit
squib into a public market area. A squib is a miniature
explosive, much like a moderately powerful firecracker. It
landed on the table of a gingerbread dealer who immediately
tossed it away onto another merchant’s table. That merchant
quickly tossed it as well when it hit and exploded, injuring one
Mr. Scott, who lost an eye as a result of the explosion. Scott
sued Shepherd in trespass. The question before the court on
Shepherd’s appeal raised a number of issues: 1) does the action
sound in trespass or trespass on the case?; 2) are the
consequences two remote for liability to vest in Shepherd?; 3)
does the third party intervener rule provide a defense for
Shepherd?
A divided court affirmed the judgment for Scott over
the dissent of none other than Judge Blackstone. Blackstone
points out that trespass lies for immediate or direct damages
while trespass on the case lies for any kind of consequential
damages. Thus, Blackstone states that the matter must be
dismissed in that it sounds in trespass. However, even more
interesting is that Blackstone argues that if the case sounds in
trespass on the case because the damages are both too remote
and subject to the third party intervener defense with the two
merchants who tossed the squib after Shephard’s original toss.
However, the majority relies on “strict liability” in
rejecting Blackstone’s rationale in a two-pronged argument: 1)
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Shepherd is liable in a strict-liability argument in that “. . .he
who does the first wrong is answerable for all the consequential
damages. . .”28; 2) since the original act, the throwing of the
squib into a public place, is an unlawful act, the miscreant is
responsible for all results.29 This hardly raised the specter of
foreseeability. However, it is Blackstone’s dissent that creates
the “first chink in the wall,” so to speak, but it is intermingles
with a significant question regarding the form of the action.
Does he rely on a concept of foreseeability or third party
intervener or some hybrid of the two? In his dissent he cites
Suppose several persons are playing at foot-ball [sic],
which is tossed by many, and at last breaks windows;
trespass vi at armis will only against the man who
struck it against the windows.30
Is Blackstone saying here that the injury to the third
party is too remote for an action to lie against the original
assault? If so, we have the presence of “foreseeability.” Or, is
he referring more to the form of the action: trespass versus
trespass on the case? He seems to rest his ultimate conclusion
on the form of the action; however, his dicta clearly states that
he believes that an action on the case would fail under a
remoteness or third party intervener analysis. Blackstone’s
opinion does seem to follow contemporary English legal
precedent that
“A line of distinction” between trespass and case settled
in Reynolds v. Clarke
[T]hat, where the immediate act itself occasions a
prejudice, or is an injury…the proper remedy is by
action of trespass vi et armis; but, where the act itself is
not an injury, but a consequence from that act is
prejudicial to the plaintiff’s person, etc his remedy is by
an action on the case.31
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Perhaps the question of when forseeability arose lies in
the distinction between trespass/trespass on the case and the
rise of negligence. Strict liability, and conversely the lack of a
foreseeability requirement, did not require the proof of
foreseeability as a necessary element to prevail on a trespass or
on the case action.32
POST PALSGRAF
In American tort law, clearly Palsgraf was a game
changer. Courts rushed to establish formulas and standards to
use to insure that there was no longer unlimited liability for any
of the potentially accused. Many of the cases that established
modern tort law involve the shipping and transportation
industries, which were the most lucrative and potentially
dangerous in the early twentieth century. Competing legal
theories soon emerged as courts continually cited foreseeability
as the reasoning for their decisions but lacked any existing
theory to justify their decisions.
Noted legal theorist Leon Green wrote The Rationale of
Proximate Cause in 1927 which established that any tort has
six requisite elements: "(1) An interest protected, (2) against
the particular hazard encountered, (3) by some rule of law, (4)
which the defendant's conduct violated, (5) thereby causing, (6)
damages to the plaintiff."33 Patrick J. Kelley, a professor of
law at Southern Illinois University, postulated in 1991 that
Green led a group of hard-line legal realists that believed that
the courts’ reliance on proximate cause limitations for liability
in decisions was really a cover for legislative policies of the
time that were not as easily citable or understandable.34
When looking at modern tort law, it is most important
to examine the period just after Palsgraf, when strong jurists
like Justice Cardozo and Learned Hand appeared to want to
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establish clear and consistent rules for tort law so that there
would be no confusion as to duties of care nor unlimited
potential liability for the accused. While public opinion may
not have always been on the same page (see Liebeck sixty
years later), Twentieth Century tort law took great strides in
limiting accused’s potential liability while also factoring in
plaintiff’s possible contributory negligence (and to an extent
establishing their own care of duty).
EARLY DAYS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE LITIGATION
POST-PALSGRAF
In McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls35, only a year
after Palsgraf, Justice Cardozo took a swing at the nuisance
area of tort law, making sure to factor in contributory
negligence into any liability equation. In this case, a woman
tripped over cement that had extended onto a driveway after
the City of Niagara Falls had ineptly installed a sidewalk three
years prior. After catching her heel, the woman sued the City
for damages, stating that their negligent cement pouring had
created a nuisance in her driveway which had caused her to
trip.
However, Justice Cardozo established here that
"whenever a nuisance has its origin in negligence," negligence
must be proven and a plaintiff "may not avert the consequences
of his [or her] own contributory negligence by affixing to the
negligence of the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance."36
Basically, Cardozo found that the woman was partly to blame
and could not just cite the city’s “nuisance” as a factor in any
perceived damages from her tripping.
“Like many of Cardozo’s innovate decisions,
McFarlane was a decision restricting potential liability.
It was also a decision that preserved uniformity and
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predictability in tort law even though it apparently
changed some rules … The more often litigants in a tort
case could anticipate the set of rules that would be
governing their conduct, the more skillfully might they
plan their affairs.”37
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,38 written by the
great jurist Learned Hand, this case established “the calculus of
negligence” or “Hand test.” In this case, the United States had
been leasing the barge Anna C, which was loaded with flour
owned by the United States and moored to Pier 52 in New
York Harbor. When the towing tug Carroll was sent out to
move another barge, it accidentally severed the mooring line
for all barges connected to Pier 52 and Anna C, now free,
ended up sinking, causing the United States to sue the Carroll
Towing Company in an indemnity action.
The crux of this case is an algebraic formula whereby if
B ≥ L x P then the accused may have met the standard of care,
with B being the burden on the accused, L the possible cost of
injury and P the foreseeable probability. If B < L x P, then the
accused will not have met the standard of care required to have
them free from liability. Often abbreviated BPL, this test is also
referred to as C > GL (where Cost is greater than Gravity of
Loss). It is important to note as well that this test first occurred
in case law in 1932 in The T.J. Hooper39, another tugboat case.
In this case, it was found that the Carroll Towing Company
failed the Calculus of Negligence test since the Court ruled that
leaving a barge unattended during daylight hours posed such a
significant risk that it would be fair to require the towing
company to have a crew member to be aboard the ship.
SHIFT TOWARDS PROTECTING DEFENDANTS AND
ADDING DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFFS
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In Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room40, much like the
McDonald’s coffee case41, this important decision (at least in
New England) involved a woman being hurt by a restaurant’s
offering that many in the public would likely scoff at. While
eating her fish chowder (the restaurant was out of the clam
chowder she initially tried to order) at a Boston restaurant, Ms.
Webster soon found herself unable to swallow after a fishbone
became lodged in her throat. Like the plaintiff in the
McDonald’s coffee case, which on its face seems like a trivial
injury, “this misadventure led to two esophagoscopies at the
Massachusetts General Hospital, in the second of which, on
April 27, 1959, a fish bone was found and removed. The
sequence of events produced injury to the plaintiff which was
not insubstantial.”42
Noting that the plaintiff had been born and raised in
New England (“a fact of some consequence” according to the
court)43, the Defendant asserted that “here was a native New
Englander eating fish chowder in a 'quaint' Boston dining place
where she had been before; that '[f]ish chowder, as it is served
and enjoyed by New Englanders, is a hearty dish, originally
designed to satisfy the appetites of our seamen and fishermen';
that '[t]his court knows well that we are not talking of some
insipid broth as is customarily served to convalescents.' We are
asked to rule in such fashion that no chef is forced 'to reduce
the pieces of fish in the chowder to miniscule size in an effort
to ascertain if they contained any pieces of bone.' 'In so ruling,'
we are told (in the defendant's brief), 'the court will not only
uphold its reputation for legal knowledge and acumen, but will,
as loyal sons of Massachusetts, save our world-renowned fish
chowder from degenerating into an insipid broth containing the
mere essence of its former stature as a culinary masterpiece.'”44
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While the initial auditor as well as the judge and jury in
the Massachusetts Superior Court (the trial level in the
Massachusetts court system) originally sided with the plaintiff,
ultimately the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided
with the Defendant’s arguments, after much discussion into the
history of chowder and even a footnote including a recipe. The
Court stated that “We are not inclined to tamper with age old
recipes by any amendment reflecting the plaintiff's view of the
effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon them … Thus,
while we sympathize with the plaintiff who has suffered a
peculiarly New England injury, the order must be Exceptions
sustained. Judgment for the defendant.”45
This case, while apparently silly and amusingly written,
is helpful to provide a look at the attitude of the era since the
Court even goes so far as to cite a similar California case
(since, in the Court’s opinion, “we know that the United States
District Court of Southern California, situated as are we upon a
coast, might be expected to share our views”46) as well as an
Ohio case that was written by the future Chief Justice Taft
(which the Court was “most impressed, however, by Allen v.
Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167, where in Ohio, the
Midwest …”47).
Continuing Justice Cardozo’s fight (and eventually the
legislatures’) against frivolous suits, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ultimately ruled in favor of the
Defendant due to an underlying sense that basically the
plaintiff should have known what she was getting herself into.
Going further than contributory negligence, the Court in this
case decided not to punish a Defendant for a Plaintiff’s
suffering an injury that could be seen as a natural and
foreseeable by-product of eating fish chowder. It is not
unreasonable for a fish bone to be found in fish chowder (now
had she been able to order the clam chowder as originally
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desired, this case would have probably had a different
outcome). Regardless, the Court here limited Plaintiff’s ability
not only to recover any damages but to sue in the first place
because the plaintiff’s ordering of the fish chowder was the
proximate cause of her suffering an injury due to a fishbone in
her food.
CONSUMER LIABILITY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
During the latter half of the twentieth century,
proximate cause case law shifted from transportation and larger
entities to the individual and consumer liability as the
individual consumer became the greater focus. There is no
greater example of this than the infamous “McDonald’s coffee”
case, aka Liebeck v. McDonald’s.
In Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants,48 while not an
appellate decision that established any grand tort theory, this
case is arguably one of the most famous of the last fifty years.
Stella Liebeck, a then 79-year-old woman, was the passenger
in her grandson’s 1989 Ford Probe, which lacked cup holders.
After going through the McDonald’s drive-through and
ordering a 49-cent cup of coffee, her grandson pulled over so
that she could add cream and sugar to her coffee. As she placed
the cup between her knees and pulled the lid off towards her,
the coffee spilled on her cotton sweatpants, causing thirddegree burns on her thighs, groin and butt. As a result, the
plaintiff had to be hospitalized for eight days and required
multiple skin grafts.
Testimony during trial included McDonald’s stating
that they purposefully kept the coffee hot so that the coffee
would remain hot during the commuters’ drive. However,
McDonald’s own research showed that people often drank the
coffee right away. By making the coffee as hot as it was served
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(around 180 degrees Fahrenheit), the plaintiff’s attorneys
argued that coffee drinkers could suffer third-degree burns in
approximately twelve to fifteen seconds. Cooling the coffee
another 20 degrees extended that time to twenty seconds.
Applying the principles of comparative negligence, the
jury found McDonald’s 80% liable and Liebeck 20% liable,
awarding her $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7
million in punitive damages (totaling two days’ worth of coffee
sales for McDonald’s). While the case never made it to
appellate court, settling for less than $600,000 before it was
heard, this case became the stereotypical example in the media
of a frivolous lawsuit and, much to the delight of huge
corporations, helped to pave the way for many states to pass
legislation capping potential tort case recovery.
To this day, many Americans, when they hear this case,
believe the plaintiff’s claims to be without merit and frivolous,
with the extent of her injuries suffered often massively
underestimated by the general populace. However, once this
case is boiled down (no pun intended), it really is simply a
proximate cause case, asking the jury to determine just how
much McDonald’s should have been able to foresee and how
much they should have been able to prevent in Liebeck’s
injuries. While the idea of a customer being able to sue because
she spilled coffee on herself may seem ridiculous on its face,
this case ultimately made corporations more responsible and
more fearful of publicity-damaging litigation, forcing them to
reexamine their care of duty and their potential proximate
cause liability while lobbying state and federal legislatures to
limit any such punitive monetary liability.
While the outcome of this case has ultimately been to
coincide with the mid-century shift back towards the
establishing of a care of duty towards the plaintiffs, this case
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was interesting in that it showed that some of the early century
trend towards establishing just how much of a care of duty
existed for the accused still was prevalent in the public mind.
This case also speaks to the difficulty of allowing juries to
determine seminal tort law – absent an appellate decision on
this case it is almost impossible to discern where courts would
have come down on this verdict (though many similar cases
were thrown out by trial courts prior to this one and most
assuredly since).
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Our analysis of the modern tort theory of proximate
cause would not be complete without a look at the Court
system of the United Kingdom, if for no other purpose than as
a comparison to the evolution of the theory in the United
States.
Before jumping into the modern field of proximate
cause in the courts of the United Kingdom, a cursory look at
the historic case law of foreseeability shows a similar
development to that of the United States. Beginning, very
simply, with the earlier mentioned Scott v. Shepard49 also
known as the Squib case, negligence is determined by a simple
“but-for” causation analysis. However, as we move into the
next century another case enters the British legal system in
1841 that displays aspects of what any American law student
would recognize as proximate cause. In Lynch v. Nurdin50 the
Court held that a defendant who negligently left a horse cart
unattended for a lengthy period of time in an area where
children are known to play is liable for harm to the plaintiff (a
child) who fell off the cart and was injured when another child
started up the horse attached to the cart. This decision
introduced the foreseeability argument into the “but-for”
causation analysis in the United Kingdom. More than thirty
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years later another case involving a horse and cart arose in
Clark v. Chambers51 (1878) where the Court found that the
defendant-landowner, who negligently blocked a carriageway
with spiked stakes, is liable for harm caused to the plaintiff
when an unknown third-party removed the stakes from the road
and put them in the middle of an adjoining footpath causing
injury to the plaintiff. Again, foreseeability is used as a means
of finding liability through a but-for analysis, and erasing the
intervening cause defense.
The historical analysis then jumps into the 20th century
with a string of three cases that set the stage for modern
causation in tort law in the United Kingdom. Starting with In
re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co.,
Ltd. (1921)52 which held defendant liable for damage “directly
traceable to the negligent act” even if that damage is not “the
exact kind of damage one would expect.” Thus utilizing the
foreseeability analysis laid out in the previous century and
adding a limitation to said analysis in terms of causation and
liability. Eleven years later, a duty is established in Donague v.
Stevenson (1932)53 which expounded the general principle that
reasonable foreseeability of physical injury to another
generates a duty of care. This principle is then explained more
thoroughly thirty years later in the Australian case Wagon
Mound I (1961)54 which stated that the injury must be
reasonably foreseeable otherwise it is “outside the scope of
duty” or “too remote.” The proposition being that reasonable
foreseeability governs the question of whether the injury comes
within the scope of duty.
As this analysis indicates the United Kingdom does
have a smattering of case law from the past two hundred years,
some of which parallels the proximate cause case law of the
United States. However, the United Kingdom never had the
seminal Palsgraf-type case that we all learn about in our Law
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School 1L torts class. There is no assumption of proximate
cause, and in fact, that term rarely to never comes up in the
literature and cases. Foreseeability is the benchmark and
standard by which all negligence cases are determined in the
UK. Per the case Bourhill v. Young’s Executor55 foreseeability
is used four times to determine: 1) whether a duty exists; 2)
whether an act or omission is a breach of duty; 3) whether
reasonable care has been taken (in the guise of probability);
and 4) for what damage the defender is liable.56 Below are
four cases that illustrate and outline the current field of
negligence analysis currently in play in the courts of the United
Kingdom.
In the facts of Jolly v. Sutton London Borough
Council,57 a small boat and trailer that had been abandoned in
1987 on a piece of open land owned by the Sutton Borough of
London and adjacent to a block of apartments also owned by
the Borough. The open land where the boat was placed was a
green space where children from the neighboring apartments
often played. In 1988 the Council placed a sticker on the boat
stating “Danger do not touch this vehicle unless you are the
owner” and also stated that the boat would be removed in
seven days if not claimed by the owner. The boat was never
removed and in mid-1989 the Plaintiff, Justin Jolly, then 13
years old, and a friend found the boat as they were walking
past. The following February the plaintiff and his friend
returned to the boat with the intention of fixing it up in order to
sail it. During the course of their repairs, which took several
months, the plaintiff and his friend turned the boat over and
propped it up so it was supported by the trailer and a jack the
plaintiff brought from home in order to crawl underneath to
render repairs. During one work session in April 1990, Justin
was alone under the boat when it started rocking. Before the
plaintiff could crawl out from under the boat, it collapsed off
the jack and trailer that were holding it up and fell onto the
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plaintiff causing him to suffer a broken back resulting in
paraplegia.
The issue that arose before the House of Lords was
whether the boat was a reasonably foreseeable trap or
allurement to children such that it would cause them injury,
and whether or not the defendants should have taken measures
to protect the plaintiff from danger. 58
At trial the court held that the accident and sustained
injury to the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable, therefore
the defendants breached their duty to plaintiff as
occupiers.59 The Appeals Court reversed and held that the
immediate cause of the injury was the plaintiff’s decision to
jack up the boat and work underneath it, essentially claiming
his “work” was an intervening cause. The Secondary Court
then when on to determine that it was not reasonably
foreseeable that the injury would occur in this way. 60 The
House of Lords ultimately agreed with the trial court and held
that even though this particular injury may not have been
foreseeable, it was foreseeable that the boat would cause
injury, thus the defendant is liable.61
The Trial Court reasoned that it was foreseeable that
children would play in the area where the dilapidated boat was
abandoned and thus could be attracted to the boat and thus
harmed by it if they were to play on it. This particular harm
was foreseeable because children imitating adults, in this case
working on the boat, is a form of play.62 The Court of Appeal
however, held that working on the boat was not playing and
therefore was not a foreseeable action.63 Upon appeal to the
House of Lords it was determined that the trial court was the
finder of fact and at trial it was determined that play can mimic
adult behavior, thus what the plaintiff and is his friend were
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doing was play. “The Court of Appeal was not entitled to
disturb the judge’s findings of fact.”64
This case hinges on the basic legal and factual concept
of foreseeability. Although it was foreseeable that the
abandoned and derelict boat could cause harm to children
playing on or in it, the exact play that was used in this case was
perhaps not foreseeable. Nonetheless, the trial court
determined that the plaintiff’s actions were play and that
therefore the damage was foreseeable. The House of Lords
goes on to determine that the Court of Appeals was wrong to
overrule the trial court’s finding of fact, and by viewing the
injury as unforeseeable meaning the defendant as not
liable. The House of Lords ruled that prevailing case law
determined that a foreseeable hazard even if an unforeseeable
consequence results in liability.65 Lord Hoffman, concurring
with the majority, states that the Council admits a duty in
regards to the damages of the boat as evidenced by the
“Danger” sign. Therefore, to eliminate this risk would have
been the same amount of effort as to eliminate the risk to the
plaintiff.66 “[T]he judge’s broad description of the risk as
being that children would ‘meddle with the boat at the risk of
some physical injury’ was the correct one to adopt on the facts
of the case. The actual injury fell within that description and I
would therefore allow the appeal.”67 Because some injury was
foreseeable to the child-residents a duty was owed to the
plaintiff. Defendant is liable because it breached this duty even
though the exact injury which occurred was not entirely
foreseeable.
In the 2004 Scottish case of Simmons v. British Steel
Plc.,68the plaintiff, Christopher Simmons, was employed by the
defendant, British Steel, doing a job which involved holding a
burning torch to strip off scrap metal. The torch was fed with
gas and oxygen through flexible tubes. On the date in question
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Simmons had climbed onto a table to complete his work,
approximately 1.5 feet off the ground. As he went to step
down off the table he became entangled in the tubes attached to
the torch and as a result fell off the table, hitting his head and
splitting the visor on his headgear. The plaintiff sustained an
injury to his right ear and complained of a sore head and a
headache. A few weeks after the accident the plaintiff’s preexisting skin condition became exacerbated and the plaintiff
developed signs of depression. This was accompanied by the
plaintiff’s inability to return to work and an ever increasing
anger at the situation.
“Some time after the accident the pursuer’s anger
exacerbated his pre-existing psoriasis and, as a result,
the defenders’ works medical officer refused to allow
him to return to work. This, too, angered the
pursuer. His prolonged absence from work caused him
to become preoccupied with the accident and more
angry at the defenders, inter alia because the defenders’
personnel department failed to visit him or to take any
interest in him. All of this resulted in a deterioration in
the pursuer’s mental state, leading to his depressive
illness.”69
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court was
correct in finding that the defendant is liable for not only the
immediate physical injuries of the accident (which it did not
contend) but also that the defendant is liable for the emotional
distress, depression, and exacerbated skin condition.
The Trial Court found that the emotional damages and
skin condition were not part of the defendant’s liability. 70 The
Second Division (appeal) found for the plaintiff and awarded
him a sum of £498,221.77.71
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The basic rule states that if physical injury to the
defendant was foreseeable, then there is a duty of care
established, and therefore the actual injury doesn’t
matter.72 “[A]ll that matters is that the defenders were in
breach of their duty of care not to expose the pursuer to the risk
of personal injury and that, as a result of the breach, the pursuer
suffered both physical and psychiatric injuries.”73 The duty
was clearly established through the employer-employee
relationship, but is further established by the fact that other
stations, similar to the one at which plaintiff worked, had
altered torches with retractable tubes to prevent accidents such
as the one in question in this case.74
The House of Lords found that “Regret, fear for future,
frustration at the slow pace of recovery and anger are all
emotions that are likely to arise, unbidden, in the minds of
those who suffer injuries in an accident such as befell the
pursuer. If, alone or in combination with other factors, any of
these emotions results in stress so intense that the victim
develops a recognized mental illness, there is no reason in
principle why he should not recover damages for that illness.”75
Thus stating the rule that defendants are liable for both physical
and psychological damage incurred as a result of the
negligence, even if this extent of injuries were not
foreseeable.76 This general rule and other rules from case law
are then laid out, being often quoted and applied in subsequent
cases.
“[O]nce liability is established, any question of
remoteness of damage is to be approached along the
following lines which may, of course, be open to
refinement and development. (1) The starting point is
that a defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind
which is not reasonably foreseeable. . .(2)While a
defender is not liable for damage that was not
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reasonably foreseeable, it does not follow that he is
liable for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable:
depending on the circumstances, the defender may not
be liable for damage caused by a novus actus
interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the
pursuer, even if it was reasonably foreseeable. . . (3)
Subject to the qualification in (2), if the pursuer’s injury
is of a kind that was foreseeable, the defender is liable,
even if the damage is greater in extent than was
foreseeable or it was caused in a way that could not
have been foreseen. . .(4) The defender must take his
victim as he finds him. . .(5) Subject again to the
qualification in (2), where personal injury to the pursuer
was reasonably foreseeable, the defender is liable for
any personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric,
which the pursuer suffers as a result of his
wrongdoing.”77
In the case of Corr (Administratix of the Estate of
Thomas Corr (Deceased)) v. Ibc Vehicles Limited,78 Thomas
Corr, now deceased, was employed by the defendant has a
maintenance engineer. On the day in question, Mr. Corr was
working on a line producing prototype vehicles when a
machine fitted with a high intensity sucker picked up a metal
panel and moved it quickly and without warning at Mr.
Corr. Mr. Corr ducked, otherwise he would have been
decapitated, however the metal did hit the right side of his head
and severed most of his right ear. As a result of this accident
Mr. Corr had to endure reconstructive surgery, he was
disfigured, and he suffered from unsteadiness, tinnitus, severe
headaches, and had trouble sleeping. Mr. Corr also suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the
accident. Due to the accident and lingering physical and
emotional effects it left on him, Mr. Corr developed depression
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and became suicidal over the next six years until 2002 when he
took his own life by jumping off a parking garage.
The issue before the House of Lords was whether the
plaintiff, the estate of Mr. Corr, can recover damages from the
defendant for the financial loss attributable to Mr. Corr’s
suicide? Was Mr. Corr’s death caused by a wrongful act,
namely the employer’s breach of duty? Or is the suicide too
remote from the accident to make the defendant liable?79
The general rule states that “it is now accepted that
there can be no recovery for damage which was not reasonably
foreseeable”80 The foreseeability issue is tackled by
determining that the depression was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the breach of duty (the accident) and the
suicide was a direct result of the depression.81 “Here, the
inescapable fact is that depression, possibly severe, possibly
very severe, was a foreseeable consequence of this breach.”82
Causation is established by using a purely but-for chain
of analysis. “[B]ut for the employer’s negligence the accident
at work would not have happened, that but for the accident at
work and the physical damage he suffered Mr. Corr would not
have become clinically depressed and that but for that
psychiatric feature he would not have entertained suicidal
thoughts or have attempted suicide.”83 When physical injuries
are foreseeable and have been caused by the defendant, the
defendant cannot then limit liability because the extent of those
physical injuries were not foreseeable.84 This rule was then
extended by a later case to include psychiatric injury.85
The court in this case applies the five principles, or
rules, laid out in Simmons86 and finds that although suicide
may not have been a foreseeable consequence in terms of the
extent of the injury (death), injury was foreseeable and there
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was a duty which was breached. Therefore, because some
injury was foreseeable, and because that injury was a result of
the accident the defendant is liable for the suicide.87
The events of Robert Eric Spencer v. Wincanton
holdings, Ltd.88 started when plaintiff was in a collision with a
stationary tractor unit while serving as a serviceman in the
Royal Air Force (RAF). The collision injured his right knee,
which remained so painful that he eventually had to terminate
his
employment
and
underwent
an
above-knee
amputation. Plaintiff adapted to his new physical situation,
obtained a new job and bought a car which was in the process
of being outfitted for use with a prosthetic leg. Before the car
could be altered for use with the prosthetic, however, plaintiff
was out in the car when he pulled into the local gas station and
without the assistance of his prosthetic leg or any sort of
crutches filled his tank up by steadying himself against his
car. As the plaintiff returned to the driver’s side he tripped
over a raised manhole cover and fell, causing him to rupture his
left quadriceps tendon and confining him to a wheelchair.
The issue before the House of Lords was whether or not
the consequences of the second accident were caused by the
negligence of the defendant, the party originally liable for the
initial accident while plaintiff was in the RAF? To answer this
question the House of Lords uses the five rules set out in
Simmons.89
“English law uses the concept of causation to attribute
responsibility for things that happen. . .In this context
the English law of tort has developed what might be
called ‘exclusionary rules.’ These are intended to assist
judges in deciding the circumstances in which a
defendant, whose liability to a claimant for a particular
occurrence has been established, will not be responsible
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for certain consequences of an act of negligence and the
damages that are claimed to flow from those
consequences. Such consequences and the damages
resulting are said to be ‘too remote’ in law to be
recoverable.”90
The court then goes on to discuss, what American law
would call proximate cause by stating that “[f]airness, baldly
stated, might be thought to take things little further than
reasonableness. But what it does is acknowledge that a
succession of consequences which in fact and in logic is
infinite will be halted by the law when it becomes unfair to let
it continue. In relation to tortious liability for personal injury,
this point is reached when (though not only when) the claimant
suffers a further injury which, while it would not have
happened without the initial injury, has been in substance
brought about by the claimant and not the tortfeaser.”91
Despite the discussion and recognition of the theory of
proximate causation and the limitations it places on negligent
causation the House of Lords ultimately holds that “[l]ike the
amputation, the fall was, on the judge’s findings, an
unexpected but real consequence of the original accident, albeit
one to which Mr. Spencer’s own misjudgment
contributed.”92 Utilizing the tried-and-true “but for” causation
analysis the court holds that the gas station accident was a
natural consequence of the original incident and would not
have happened but for the original negligence.
As this succession of these cases from the past 15 years
shows, the courts of the United Kingdom are holding very
closely to the but-for causation analysis. Rather than limiting
liability assigned to the defendant by cutting the chain of
events, the courts in the UK are in fact expanding liability
through factually based foreseeability analysis. What is also
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clear through the broader analysis and discussion within the
case law, is that there is the idea of a limitation on defendant
liability, similar to that of the role of proximate cause in the
United States, there just has not yet been the widespread
application of such a limitation.
CONCLUSION
In law school classrooms all across the country, first
year students are struggling with the concept of proximate
cause. They aren’t alone. “Attorneys and the courts fail to
understand the task involved in deciding the question and are
often confused by terms such as proximate cause and
foreseeability.”93 The courts of our nation, as well as the courts
of our fellow common law country the United Kingdom,
continue to struggle with this nebulous legal concept. Where
does foreseeability attach? Is it part of duty or causation?
What if the plaintiff contributed to the action? These questions
are indicative of the struggle that lawyers, judges, legal
scholars, and our society as a whole must grapple with when
confronted with a system of common law, the evolution of
legal concept. What is clear from case law and analysis over
the past century is that liability has shifted away from the
defendant with the devaluing of the but-for analysis, and
towards a more thoughtful, and limiting, analysis based in
proximate cause. While the evolution has been relatively quick
to progress in the United States, perhaps due in part to the ever
growing interests of big business, in the United Kingdom they
are still working to figure out if a limitation on liability via a
proximate cause analysis is appropriate. Moving forward into
the jurisprudence of the 21st century, the courts will need to
determine more fully how to define and apply proximate cause
in negligence tort cases. Common law is only useful if we can
rely on it for precedent, even if that precedent is evolving.
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